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Diseases of Obscure Etiology: Legal Aspects
Paul D. Rheingold*
B OTH LAW AND MEDICINE are plagued with diseases of obscure
etiology. These are the diseases in which the cause or causes
are unknown or in which the role of trauma is at least an un-
certain factor. For law the question is whether damages may be
awarded where one who suffers from a disease is unable to show
that trauma is recognized by medicine as a factor in the causa-
tion or aggravation of that disease. The legal issue may arise in
tort actions or in workmen's compensation proceedings, and in
the latter not only trauma but also other types of occupational
exposures may be the alleged cause.
The absence of knowledge on etiology is not so much an irri-
tation to medicine as it is to law, however. To the doctor the
"cause" in any particular case may indeed be irrelevant. The
doctor diagnoses on the basis of symptoms and treats pragmati-
cally on the basis of the effects of previously successful methods.
The doctor is likely to regard all diseases as obscure to a point;
he sees no bright line between diseases of "known" and of "un-
-known" etiology. Further, he sees diseases as of multiple causa-
tion. To him it may seem unrewarding to talk of one specific
"cause." 1
The purpose of this note is to gather and analyze legal cases
which have involved diseases characterized by the courts or
medical witnesses as being of obscure etiology or in which the
role of trauma is uncertain. 2 Basic to this discussion is an under-
standing of the concepts of causation, precipitation and aggrava-
tion as they are used both legally and medically. These concepts
* Member of the law firm of Speiser, Shumate, Geoghan & Law, New York
City; Member of the Massachusetts and District of Columbia Bars.
1 From the medical standpoint, see Brahdy, ed., Disease and Injury (1961);
Reed & Emerson, Relationship Between Injury and Disease (1938); Leas,
Trauma and Disease, in Medical Facts for Legal Truth 20 (Schroeder ed.
1961). Two good works of a medico-legal nature are Schweitzer, Proof of
Traumatic Injuries (1961); American Jurisprudence, Proof of Facts. For
damages aspects see, Belli, Modern Trials (1954 plus supp.); Oleck, Dam-
ages to Persons & Property (1961 revision). See also Moritz & Thulberg,
eds., Trauma and Disease (1959).
2 Excluded from this note, therefore, are the numerous, common cases in
which it is medically well-acknowledged that trauma has a role in the
causation or precipitation of the disease and the only issue is whether in
fact in the particular case trauma was a substantial factor. Examples are
diabetes, polio, ulcers, and heart disease.
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have been well described from the medico-legal point of view in
recent articles by Averbach3 and others.
4
List of Diseases Regarded as Obscure5
A. Multiple Sclerosis.6 A good number of cases have in-
volved awards for multiple sclerosis following subjection to
trauma, both in tort 7 and in workmen's compensation actions.5
B. Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis.9 Only two cases have
been found involving a claim for amyotrophic lateral sclerosis,
a fatal neuromuscular disease commonly referred to as "Lou
Gehrig's Disease." 10 In one, Smith v. Stevens," the worker's
evidence indicated that his condition, following a fall, was either
ALS or Guillain-Barr6 syndrome, itself a disease of obscure
etiology.12 The court, in reversing a dismissal on the worker's
case, stated:
While it is true that accidents, physical conditions, and the
symptoms indicating disability, could have been coincidents,
it does not seem at all probable in a man who had no knowl-
edge from experience or information of any latent disease
or physical impairment. After giving due consideration to
all the evidence, the history and nature of the accident, and
the sequence of events following the accident, we are of the
opinion that the evidence of the plaintiff preponderates.13
3 Averbach, Causation: A Medico-Legal Battlefield, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev.
209 (1957).
4 Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause, 31 Tex. L. Rev. 627 (1953). Note,
Causation in Disease: Quantum of Proof Required to Reach The Jury, 53
Nw. U. L. Rev. 793 (1959); Annot., 66 A. L. R. 2d 1082.
5 See the excellent medical discussion by Dr. D. S. O'Doherty, 8 Practical
Lawyer 31 (Feb. 1962); see also Brahdy, supra note 1, at 353.
6 Brahdy, supra note 1, at 353.
7 Weller v. Northwest Airlines, 239 Minn. 298, 58 N. W. 2d 739 (1953);
Sourian v. Jones, 350 Ill. App. 365, 112 N. E. 2d 920 (1954).
8 Cohrs v. Igo Bros., Inc., 71 N. J. Super 435, 177 A. 2d 284 (1962); Me-
chanics Universal Joint Div. v. Ind. Comm'n, 21 Ill. 2d 535, 173 N. E. 2d 479
(1961); Stella v. Mancuso, 7 App. Div. 2d 673, 179 N. Y. S. 2d 169 (1958);
Missouri Pacific Trans. Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S. W. 2d 41 (1957);
Pipero v. Klar, 279 App. Div. 2d 960, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 156 (1952); Galloway v.
Ford Motor Co., 5 N. J. 396, 75 A. 2d 855 (1950); Schust v. Wright Aero-
nautical Corp., 7 N. J. Super 54, 71 A. 2d 894 (1950); Hebert v. Fifteen Oil
Co., 46 So. 2d 328 (La. App. 1950).
9 From the medical viewpoint, see Alpers & Farmer, 62 Arch. Neurol.
Psychiat. 178 (1949); Veit, 106 J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 129 (1947).
10 Smith v. Stevens, 173 Neb. 723, 114 N. W. 2d 724 (1962); Harrison v.
Keller, 117 N. W. 2d 477 (Iowa 1962).
11 See note 10.
12 A settlement for Guillain-Barr6 disease following trauma in a compensa-
tion case is reported in 3 NACCA News Letter No. 6 (April 1960) p. 18.
13 At p. 729.
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C. Paget's Disease.'4 Four cases15 have been found dealing
with Paget's Disease, also called osteitis deformans, one of
which, Brett v. J. M. Carras, Inc.," is to be regarded as one of
the leading cases in the field of obscure disease compensation
since it states that the issue of causation is for the jury even
though medicine has not made up its mind yet with absolute
certainty.
D. Buerger's Disease.17 The opinion of the Supreme Court
in the Michalic case' s is the leading case involving Buerger's
Disease, which is sometimes referred to as thromboangiitis obli-
terans. A number of other cases have also allowed tort 19 and
compensation actions.2 0
E. Carcinomas. So much has been written on the specific
subject of cancer as a disease of unknown etiology and in which
trauma is an unknown factor and so many cases have been de-
cided on the issue that it will serve the purposes of this article
merely to make reference to some general works. The outstand-
ing article2 1 here is Parsons, Sufficiency of Proof in Traumatic
Cancer Cases.
22
F. Leukemia. Damages have been awarded in cases of leu-
14 See Brahdy, supra note 1 at 363; Flaxman, Medical Trial Tech. Quar.,
June, 1956, p. 1.
15 Brett v. J. M. Carras, Inc., 203 F. 2d 451 (3d Cir. 1953); Roth v. Board of
Trustees, 49 N. J. Super 309, 139 A. 2d 761 (1958); Flynn v. First National
Bank & Trust Co., 131 Conn. 430, 40 A. 2d 770 (1944); W. P. Fuller & Co.,
v. Ind. Acc. Comm'n, 27 Cal. Rptr. 401" (Cal. App. 1962).
' See note 15.
17 See Schweitzer, supra note 1, s. 235; Medical Trial Tech. Quar. 1955 An-
nual 44, 264.
18 Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U. S. 325 (1960).
19 Allied Van Lines v. Parsons, 80 Ariz. 88, 293 P. 2d 430 (1956); Cincinnati
Realty Co. v. McElvoy, 250 S. W. 2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Powell v.
Preston Theaters Corp., 63 Idaho 594, 124 P. 2d 562 (1942).
20 Newman v. Kamp, 374 P. 2d 100 (Mont. 1962); Forbes v. Jung Mfg. Co.,
125 F. Supp. 679 (D. Minn. 1954); Quaker Oats Co. v. Ind. Comm'n, 414 Ill.
326, 111 N. E. 2d 351 (1953) (a leading case); United States Pipe & Foundry
Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm'n, 201 Cal. App. 2d 545, 20 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1962).
21 While reference is made only to trauma in the text, there are other al-
leged causes of cancer which raise issues of liability, including the smoking
of tobacco and exposure to various chemicals in industry.
22 46 Cornell L. Q. 581 (1961), repr. 1962 Personal Injury Annual 337. See
also Brahdy, supra note 1, at c. 10; Auster, The Role of Trauma in Onco-
genesis; A Juridical Consideration, 175 J. A. M. A. 946 (1961), repr. 2 Tort &
Medical Yearbook 512 (1962).
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kemia when that form of cancer has followed trauma,23 radia-
tion,24 or exposure to various chemicals.
25
G. Hodgkin's Disease. Gaior v. City of Pittsburgh26 recently
allowed recovery here where death from this cancer-like disease
followed a fall by six months.
H. Systemic Lupus Erythematosus. This collagen disease of
the arteries was recently involved in litigation in Smith v. Gar-
side.2 7
I. Polyarteritis Nodosa. Like Buerger's Disease and SLE,
this condition is also a collagen disease and was the basis for
compensation in a recent West Virginia case.
28
J. Rheumatoid Arthritis. With other forms of arthritis there
is virtually no etiological problem, but in the case of rheumatoid
arthritis (and with rheumatic fever as well 29) courts and com-
pensation boards have been perplexed with issues of causation.30
K. Parkinson's Disease.31 Several cases have allowed claims
based upon the appearance of Parkinsonism after trauma or other
occupational exposures, the leading case of which is Gaffney v.
Ind. Acc. Bd.32
23 McCann Steel Co. v. Carney, 192 Tenn. 94, 237 S. W. 2d 942 (1951); In
the Matter of Elizabeth Maypother, Employees' Comp. Appeal Bd, Docket
No. 52-140, 1953, 12 NACCA L. J. 85.
24 Besner v. Walter Kidde Nuclear Laboratories, 18 App. Div. 2d 952, 237
N. Y. S. 2d 585 (1963); Smith v. Young, 168 N. E. 2d 3, 109 Ohio App. 463
(1963) (uranium hexafluoride); Mahoney v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 523
(E. D. Tenn. 1962).
25 Berman v. A. Werman & Sons, 14 App. Div. 2d 631, 218 N. Y. S. 2d 315
(1961) (benzol); Crowley's Case, 130 Maine 1, 153 Atl. 194 (1931) (carbon
monoxide); cf. Zaefel v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 284 App. Div. 2d
693, 134 N. Y. S. 2d 377 (1954) (aplastic anemia from benzol exposure).
26 188 Pa. Super. 371, 146 A. 2d 320 (1958). Medically, see Healy et al., 64
Radiology 51 (1955).
27 355 P. 2d 849 (Nev. 1960). Medically, see Lawyers Medical Cyclopedia
s. 15.45(A) (Supp. 1963).
28 Vankirk v. State Comp. Comm'r, 144 W. Va. 447, 108 S. E. 2d 567 (1959).
See the medical citation in the preceding footnote.
29 See Brahdy, supra note 1, at 99; Leas, supra note 1, at 28.
30 See Grice v. Dickerson, Inc., 127 S. E. 2d 722 (S. C. 1962) (leading case);
Rysdon v. Wice, 34 Ill. App. 2d 290, 180 N. E. 2d 754 (1962); McCoy v.
Bockow, 16 App. Div. 2d 722, 226 N. Y. S. 2d 867 (1962); Erbs v. Sheffield
Farms Co., 272 App. Div. 1082, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 555 (1947). See Brahdy, supra
Note 1, at 419.
31 From a medical standpoint, see Brahdy, supra note 1, at 341; 4 Trau-
matic Med. & Surg. Atty. 622 (1961).
32 129 Mont. 394, 287 P. 2d 256 (1955). See also Conti v. Washburn Wire Co.,
77 R. I. 31, 72 A. 2d 842 (1950); Ligenza v. White Foundry Co., 136 N. J. L.
436, 56 A. 2d 580 (1948); Fredholm v. Smith, 193 Minn. 569, 259 N. W. 80
(1935) (tort action for tremor resembling paralysis agitans which developed
3 months after auto accident).
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L. Lichen Planus.3 3 This obscure disease was involved in a
recent New Jersey case in which a worker fell into some hot
tar.3
4
M. Erythema Multiforme.35 This is another rare disease of
the allergic type, for which compensation was also awarded in
a recent New Jersey case. 36
N. Dermatomyositis. Two cases recently have involved this
rare muscular disease, from Tennessee 37 and Pennsylvania. 38
0. Panniculitis. This skin disease, similar to lichen planus,
was recently the basis for a recovery in the compensation case
of Maryland Cas. Co. v. Miller.39
P. Dupuytren's Contracture10 A number of cases have al-
lowed recovery for the contraction of this condition, as against
evidence from a faction of the medical profession that trauma,
at least a single blow, cannot be an etiological factor.41
Q. Other Conditions. A number of other diseases or condi-
tions should be mentioned as partially belonging within this list
of diseases of obscure etiology: peptic ulcers; 42 Charcot's Dis-
ease; 43 regional enteritis and ulcerative colitis; 44 fibrositis (fibro-
33 See 6 Traumatic Med. & Surg. Atty. 609 (1962) for medical data.
34 De Vito v. Mullen's Roofing Co., 72 N. J. Super. 233, 178 A. 2d 226, cert.
den. 37 N. J. 222, 181 A. 2d 9 (1962).
35 From the medical standpoint, see 6 Traumatic Med. & Surg. Atty. 592
(1962).
36 Green v. Al Green Enterprises, Inc., 73 N. J. Super. 132, 179 A. 2d 151
(1962). See also In re Look's Case, 185 N. E. 2d 626 (Mass. 1962).
37 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Miller, 358 S. W. 2d 316 (Tenn. 1962) (inhalation of
tile dust).
38 A trial court opinion is reported in 6 NACCA News Letter 106 (May
1963).
39 See note 37.
40 From the medical standpoint, see 1959 Med. Trial Tech. Annual 79; Lar-
sen, 42-A J. Bone Jt. Surg. 919 (1960).
41 Hall v. Ocean County, 72 N. J. Super. 395, 178 A. 2d 354 (1962); Sullivan
v. Perez, 30 Misc. 2d 209, 220 N. Y. S. 2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Walsh v. Kot-
ler, 46 N. J. Super. 206, 134 A. 2d 458 (1957); Hedlund v. United Exposition
Decorating Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 972, 225 N. Y. S. 2d 613 (1962); Clarke v.
B. C. Electric Ry., [1949] 1 W. W. R. 977, 2 W. W; R. 832 (B. C. C. A.).
42 See Wallace v. Crofton Colliery Pty. Ltd., [1956] W. C. R. 32. From the
medical viewpoint, see Brahdy, supra note 1, at 225; Leas, supra note 1, at 23.
43 See Brahdy, supra note 1, at 412; 4 Lawyers Med. Cyc. 32:37 (1960).
44 See Brahdy, supra note 1, at 246; Huff et al., 180 J. A. M. A. 491 (1962).
Jan., 1964
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sis) ;45 exophthalmic goiter; 46 herpes zoster; 47 tuberculosis; 48 and
cerebral palsy and other prenatal injuries or birth defects.
49
Use of a Sequence-of-Events Test
Analysis of the cases in the preceding section indicates that
in some cases no medical testimony on causal relation was offered
and in others what expert testimony there was offered was by
the very nature of the problem speculative and indecisive. To
allow a litigant to make a submissible case in this situation, many
of the courts in the cases cited above utilized what might be called
a "sequence-of-events" test. By this they substitute for medical
proof or supplement uncertain medical testimony with a mixture
of lay knowledge and circumstantial evidence. Once a court
takes this approach the burden of going forward is in effect shift-
ed to the defendant to show an absence of causal relation.
But the proper use of a sequence-of-events or progress-of-
the-case test is not without its judically created requirements.
Upon analysis of the cases it becomes apparent that the courts
have been applying certain criteria or insisting on the proof of
the occurrence of certain basic events in order to determine cau-
sation. These general factors, which might be called the "Ewing
Postulates" 5o for the entire obscure etiology field, can be listed
as follows:
1-good health and body integrity before the accident;
2-trauma or other exposure of a nature, severity and local-
ity not inconsistent with later development of the disease;
3-proper immediate effects of both a subjective and objec-
tive nature;
45 See Pearce v. Rourke [1951] 1 W. W. R. (N. S.) 305 (Alta.).
46 See Brahdy, supra note 1, at 460; Leas, supra note 1, at 28.
47 See 1960 Med. Trial Tech. Annual 93, citing cases.
48 While there is no problem of etiology or the role of trauma here, the
courts have tended to approach the problem similarly to that above. See,
Ernest v. Boggs Lake Estates, Inc., 12 N. Y. 2d 414, 190 N. E. 2d 528 (1963);
Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U. S. 107 (1959); Hazel-
wood v. Hodge, 357 S. W. 2d 711 (Ky. 1961); Combustion Engineering Co. v.
Burke, 357 S. W. 2d (Tenn. 1962); Vidrine v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 137
So. 2d 666 (La. App. 1962); Poneitowcki v. Harres, 200 Wis. 504, 228 N. W.
126 (1929); Greave's Case, 186 N. E. 2d 605 (Mass. 1962).
49 Involving cerebral palsy, see Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 58 Wash.
2d 288, 367 P. 2d 835 (1962); 4 NACCA News Letter No. 1 (Jan. 1961) p. 23;
4 id. No. 4 (April 1961) p. 21. Generally on prenatal injuries and congenital
defects, see Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating
to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 554 (1962).
50 Reference is made to the postulates on the causation of cancer put forth
by Dr. Ewing, and discussed by the references in note 22 supra.
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4-bridging symptoms between the time of the accident and
of the appearance of the disease with the interval being
neither too long nor too short;
5-diagnosis of the disease, presenting a not inconsistent on-
set, site and course, combined with the elimination of other
possible causes.51
The sequence test has often been criticized as embodying a
logical fallacy, post hoc ergo propter hoc. That is, just because
the disease follows injury it cannot be said to be causally related
to it. Critics inquire how law can reach a decision on a medical
issue before medicine has.52 The purpose of a trial, however, is
not to determine some pure medical principle for the purpose of
enlightening indecisive professional brethren. It is to decide a
dispute between parties to a particular case, on the basis of the
evidence therein presented. The burden is upon the moving
party to produce a preponderance of the evidence, of course, not
absolute medical certainty. It would probably be more unjust
to deny all claims until medicine finally arrived at a consensus
on causation than to allow compensation to all those who can fit
their facts within a respectable theory of medicine, even if it is
a minority.53 And, as has been astutely remarked, "Perhaps the
doctor himself is to blame in part because he has failed to realize
the social purpose for using a scientific theory to prove in a court
before a jury what 'caused' an accident." 54
Proof Required in Obscure Etiology Cases
Expert medical testimony is desirable in cases involving dis-
eases of obscure etiology, if only to show that trauma could be
a factor in the causation or precipitation of a disease. Numerous
cases have allowed medical testimony phrased in terms of possi-
bilities to combine with circumstantial evidence to create a pre-
51 Generally see Brahdy, supra note 1, at 5. Note that if the issue is not
direct causation, but aggravation, some modification of these criteria must
be made. For example, for 1 the courts will properly substitute the proof
of the existence of a pre-existing disease.
52 Stated Judge Friendly recently, "So long as the decision of complex
medical issues is left to laymen, it must be expected that juries will oc-
casionally provide news for doctors." Evans v. S. J. Grove & Sons Co., 316
F. 2d 335 (2d Cir. 1963).
53 As was stated in the Brett case, supra note 15, courts cannot allow limits
of scientific knowledge to prevent the awarding of damages in just claims.
54 Stason et al., Atoms and The Law 427 (1959); cf. Horovitz, Workmen's
Compensation: Half Century of Judicial Developments, 41 Neb. L. Rev. 1,
42-46 (1962).
Jan., 1964
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ponderance. 51 Circumstantial evidence is used, in effect, to raise
the possibility created by medical evidence into a probability. To
facilitate this approach more and more courts are allowing doc-
tors to speak in terms of possibilities ("might" or "could") rather
than probabilities or "reasonable medical certainty." 56 Nor is
medical opinion to be struck down as "speculative" merely on
the basis that there is no medical certainty as to underlying prin-
ciples.57 Even though the doctor must to a certain extent specu-
late, he is aided by his knowledge and appreciation of the general
factors in the post-traumatic picture which have normal dele-
terious tendencies, including injury to tissue, devitalization of
the region injured, decreased resistance and increased suscepti-
bility of the system involved, the body and the psyche. These
factors make at least a partial basis for an opinion. It should be
noted that it also has been frequently held that where there is
some medical evidence but it is inconclusive, the jury can make
its own inferences of causation.5
It is also quite possible for an award to be made without any
medical testimony being presented at all, based solely upon the
sequence-of-events test. The leading case here is Valente v.
Bourne Mills, 59 a workmen's compensation action for cancer, in
which it is stated:
[M]edical evidence, although highly desirable, is not
always essential for an injured employee to make out a
prima facie case, especially if the testimony is adequate, un-
55 E.g., Walters v. Smith, 222 Md. 62, 158 A. 2d 619 (1960) (compensation;
neurological disease); General Motors v. Freeman, 164 A. 2d 686 (Del. 1960)
(compensation; eye damage); Blackfoot Coal & Land Corp. v. Cooper, 121
Ind. App. 313, 95 N. E. 2d 639 (1950) (compensation; cancer); Charlton
Bros. v. Garrettson, 188 Md. 85, 51 A. 2d 642 (1947) (tort; leading case);
Lee v. Blessing, 131 Conn. 569, 41 A. 2d 337 (1945) (tort; cancer).
56 See, Markus, Semantics of Traumatic Causation, 12 Clev-Mar. L. R. 233
(1963). For a general discussion see 29 NACCA L. J. 195, 200-04 (1963); in
addition see the recent cases of Ernest v. Boggs Lake Estates, Inc., note 48
supra (opinions not to be rejected because dcotors fail to use the words pre-
ferred by lawyers or judges; whole record to be examined to see if it pre-
sents substantial evidence); Healy v. Nordhaus, 188 N. E. 2d 277 (Ill. App.
1963).
57 See Boyd v. Young, 193 Tenn. 272, 246 S. W. 2d 10 (1951) (compensation;
acceleration of cancer); Pittman v. Pillsbury Flour Mills, 234 Minn. 517, 48
N. W. 2d 735 (1951) (compensation; single trauma cancer); Quaker Oats
case, note 20 supra. See Averbach, supra note 3.
58 See Grice case, supra note 30, an excellent statement; Smith v. Stevens,
supra note 10; Menarde v. Philadelphia Trans. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 103 A. 2d
681 (1954) (tort; cancer); Comeau v. Beck, 319 Mass. 17, 64 N. E. 2d 436
(1945) (tort; miscarriage).
59 77 R. I. 274, 75 A. 2d 191 (1950).
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disputed and unimpeached. Thus where, as in the instant
case, injury appears in a bodily member reasonably soon
after an accident, at the very place where the force is ap-
plied, and with symptoms observable to the ordinary person,
there arises, in the absence of believed testimony to the con-
trary, a natural inference that the injury, whatever may be
the medical name, was the result of the employment .... If
the reasonable probabilities flowing from the undisputed evi-
dence disclose a progressive course of events beginning with
an external accident in which each succeeding happening
including the injury appears traceable to the one that pre-
ceded it, medical evidence is not essential for an injured em-
ployee to make out a prima facie case. 60
Nor are the cases in which there has been a recovery without
medical evidence limited to compensation. In the recent case of
Wilhelm v. State Traffic Safety Comm.6 1 inexplicable depigmen-
tation of the skin following trauma was involved. Stated the
court:
There are, unquestionably, many occasions where the causal
connection between a defendant's negligence and a disability
claimed by a plaintiff does not need to be established by
expert testimony. Particularly is this true when the dis-
ability develops coincidentally with, or within a reasonable
time after, the negligent act, or where the causal connection
is clearly apparent from the illness itself and the circum-
stances surrounding it, or where the cause of the injury re-
lates to matters of common experience, knowledge, or obser-
vation of laymen.62
In summary, it has usually been no bar to a claim that the
etiology of the disease involved in the case is obscure or that the
60 75 A. 2d at 194 (1948). See also Tonkovich v. Dept. Labor & Ind., 31 Wash.
2d 220, 195 P. 2d 638 (compensation; cancer); Southern S.S. Co. v. Norton, 41
F. Supp. 103 (E. D. Pa. 1940) (cancer). Larson suggests a partial justifica-
tion for allowing compensation boards to determine etiology where no medi-
cal evidence is given: the boards are relying in part upon their own
knowledge of medicine, gained through experience. 2 Larson, Workmen's
Compensation 299-303 (1952).
61 299 Md. 406, 185 A. 2d 715 (1962).
62 185 A. 2d at 719. An alternative source of proof in obscure etiology cases
should be noted since it has been used at times to strengthen other evi-
dence or to itself meet the burden of proof. This is statistical or physical
evidence. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 125 F. Supp. 261 (D. D. C.
1954) (tuberculosis; high incidence in area where claimant worked was evi-
dence that contraction was work connected); Gilbert Pacific Inc. v. Dono-
van, 198 F. Supp. 297 (E. D. La. 1961) (same); Wallace case, note 42 supra
(physics used to explain cause of peptic ulcer formation); but see Miller v.
National Cabinet Co., 8 N. Y. 2d 277, 168 N. E. 2d 811 (1960) (rejecting
statistical evidence).
Jan., 1964
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role of trauma is not yet medically certain. While difficult prob-
lems of proof are involved in this area, the action is basically the
same as any case embodying a disputed medical point. Courts
and compensation boards must be cautious in applying a se-
quence-of-events test because what may appear at times to be
everyday cause and effect relationship may be totally discredited
scientifically. By application of the criteria outlined above and
by insistence upon the production of competent medical testi-
mony wherever applicable, the courts will do well, however, to
continue to allow actions to be maintained for the contraction of
diseases, as to the cause of which medicine is presently uncertain.
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss1/13
